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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This litigation arises from a lawsuit regarding a mme collapse which 
occurred at the Lucky Friday mine in North Idaho on April 15, 2011. Miners Pete 
Marek and his brother, Mike Marek, were assigned to work in the 6150-15 stope of 
the Lucky Friday mine on April 15, 2011. During the course of their shift that day, 
the mine collapsed, killing Pete Marek and injuring Mike Marek. 
The plaintiffs-appellants in this action, Patricia Marek, Michael Marek, Jodie 
Marek, and Hayley Marek (collectively, "the Mareks"), subsequently filed suit 
against the defendants-respondents in this action, Hecla Limited, Hecla Mining 
Company, Silver Hunter Mining Company, Phillip S. Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug 
Bayer, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro (collectively, "Hecla"), 
seeking damages related to Pete Marek's death and Mike Marek's injuries. In 
particular, the Mareks have asserted that it was Heda's reckless decision to remove 
a pillar from the area that Mike and Pete were working in that caused the collapse. 
The Mareks contend that decision, coupled with the unwarrantable failure by the 
mine to evaluate the safety and advisability of the removal and the concomitant 
unwarrantable failure to ensure the safety of the miners working in that area, 
represent acts so egregious as to allow their suit to proceed and not be barred by the 
general exclusivity of the workers' compensation scheme. 
Hecla argued that the action by the Mareks against Hecla is barred by the 
workers' compensation exclusivity provision found in Idaho Code §72-209(1): 
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72-209. EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER. (1) 
Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of 
the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other 
liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, 
legal representatives or assigns. 
The Mareks, on the other hand, contend that the rock fall at the mme 
resulting from Heda's reckless conduct in removing the pillar and leaving 
rock suspended and unsupported with no or inadequate engineering analysis 
of the safety of that course of action, and failing to ensure the safety of 
miners sent into a highly dangerous stope with virtually no safety measures 
taken in light of the unjustifiable removal of the pillar fell within the 
exception to the exclusivity provision, as outlined in I.C. §72-209(3): 
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this 
section shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, 
agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety, provided 
that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in any case where 
the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or 
employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor 
and shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or 
authorized by the employer, or the employer was a party thereto. 
(Emphasis added.) Following summary judgment briefing and arguments, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor Hecla on the question of 
workers' compensation exclusivity, and denied the Mareks' own motion for 
summary judgment seeking to strike Heda's affirmative defense asserting workers' 
compensation exclusivity. The District Court also denied the Mareks' motion for 
reconsideration of such determination. 
This appeal followed. 
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B. Course of the Proceedings 
This action was initially filed on April 12, 2013, in the District Court for the 
County of Kootenai. Hecla initially filed its Answer on November 8, 2013, 
subsequently amending it on June 27, 2014 to add an additional affirmative 
defense. Defendant Ron Krusemark was later dismissed by stipulation on March 
11, 2015. 
Cross-motions were filed by the Mareks and Hecla on February 10, 2015, and 
February 23, 2015, respectively. Hearing upon the cross-motions was held on April 
14, 2015, and the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was entered on April 21, 2015. Judgment was subsequently 
entered on May 5, 2015. 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 29, 2015, upon which a 
hearing was held on August 18, 2015. The motion was denied from the bench, with 
a related written Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration being later 
filed on September 3, 2015. 
The Mareks timely filed their Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2015. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
The Lucky Friday mine near Mullan, Idaho, is one of the nation's deepest 
underground silver producing mines. (Record ("R.") 14 (,r21); R. 45 Cir21).) Plaintiff 
Larry "Pete" Marek was an experienced miner with more than 26 years of 
experience in the mining industry as of April 2011, who had worked for Hecla for 
approximately 8 years prior to April 2011. (R. 14 (,rif23-24); R. 45 (i[,[23-24).) 
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Plaintiff Mike Marek, Pete's brother, is an experienced miner with more than 25 
years of experience in the mining industry as of April 2011, who had worked for 
Hecla for approximately 7 years prior to April 2011. (R. 14 (,r,r22, 25-26); R. 45 
c,r,r22, 26-26).) 
Mining at the Lucky Friday mme was done via the "underhand stope"l 
method; after an area (the stope) was mined out, it would be filled in with a sand 
and concrete mixture to serve as a competent ceiling below which the next mineral-
rich area underneath would then be mined. (R. 24 (Ruff Depo, 11. 24:12-24).) 
In mining the previous two cuts above the cut at issue, pillars2 of waste rock 
were left in place, with ore mined from both sides of the pillar. (R. 696 (Jordan 
Depo, 11. 27:19-28:2).) In cut 3 of the 6150-15 stope, the pillars were extracted in the 
mining process on both sides of the stope for a distance greater than had ever been 
done before at the mine. (See, e.g., R. 717-718 (Lund Depo, 11. 13:18-14:13); R. 500 
(Bayer Depo, 11. 26:24-28:4).) The effect was to undermine the rock pillar for a 
1 A "stope" is simply the term for a tunnel from which ore is mined at a particular level in a mine. 
The technical designation of the stope at issue in this matter 6150-15-3 provides more specific 
detail as to where exactly in the mine the collapse occurred: "6150" refers to the level/depth within 
the mine that the stope is located (6,150 feet underground); "15" refers to the particular stope (versus 
other numbered tunnels at the 6150 level); and "3" refers to the 'cut' in that particular stope, which 
is the measure of the number of layers of the tunnel that have been mined out via blasting and 
ore/waste removal (here, the tunnel was in the process of the third 'cut,' with two prior cuts above 
having been removed and filled with a sand and concrete mixture). The stope is entered through a 
"slot," an access tunnel from the main underground travel ways. Here, the slot runs south from the 
travel way to the stope, where it intersects the stope in a T-shaped intersection. Each of the "arms" 
of the stope are designated by compass direction from the slot - Pete Marek was working in "6150-
15-3-West" at the time of the collapse at issue, and Mike Marek was working in "6150-15-3-East." 
2 As some stopes are mined in the Lucky Friday, depending on where the particular veins of ore are 
located and the concentration of minerals in the rock, a central pillar of rock may be left behind 
essentially splitting a stope into two smaller tunnels, one on each side of the rock left in place. This 
"pillar" may be used to prevent the tunnel from getting too wide, or to minimize dilution of the 
extracted materials with rock that does not contain valuable ore. (See generally, R. 178 (Ruff Depo, 
11. 87:11-24); see also, R. 527 .) 
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distance of approximately 74 feet, leaving the roof of the stope which contained 
rock and sand/concrete fill from the previously-mined stope above -
unsupported. (R. 408-409 (Ruff Depa Exh. 5); R. 497 (Bayer Depo, 11. 15:1-16:1); R. 
718 (Lund Depo, 11. 15:10-13).) 
On April 15, 2011, Pete and Mike Marek started their shift at the Lucky 
Friday, to work in the 6150-15-3 stope. (R. 15 (,r,r29-31); R. 45-46 (,r,r29 & 31).) 
Pete Marek went into the west stope, and Mike Marek went into the east stope, to 
water down the muck pile, as their work area was otherwise muck-bound.3 (R. 15 
c,rif 35-36); R. 46 cif 34).) 
While Pete and Mike were working in the 6150-15 stope, the back4 in the 
west stope, where Pete was working, collapsed. (R. 15-16 (iI38); R. 46 ,r38.) Tons of 
rock, some in the form of large blocks representing an instantaneous failure, and in 
what at least one miner described as the largest rock fall he'd ever seen, filled the 
stope. (R. 537-538 (Krusemark Depo, 11. 33:22-35:5); accord, R. 509-510 (Bayer 
Depo, 11. 63:21-66:20).) 
Search and rescue efforts were made to rescue Pete for the next 9 days; Pete's 
body was found on April 24, 2011. (R. 16 c,r,r41-43); R. 47 (i[if 42-43).) The federal 
Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") thereafter conducted an 
3 "Muck" is simply the term for broken rock after a blast. (R. 127 (Ruff Depo, 11. 36: 13-17 .) If an area 
is "muck-bound," it means that there is no additional room at the time to move muck to a storage 
area, and, therefore, the remaining muck cannot be moved out of the stope. (R. 593 (McGillis Depo, 
11. 96:17-98:12).) The purpose of wetting muck in a stope is to keep dust down, explained by other 
miners as a standard operating procedure to be done even when miners were muck-bound. (R. 618 
(Houchin Depo, 11. 23:8-18); R. 593-594 (McGillis Depo, 11. 97:25-98:9); R. 636 & 647-649 (Stepro 
Depo, 11. 35:4-37:12 & Depo. Exh. 15); R. 123-124 (Ruff Depo, 11. 32:25-33:3).) 
4 In mining terminology, the "back" is the roof of the tunnel. 
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investigation, and, on August 8, 2011, issued three citations related to the removal 
of pillars in the 6150-15 stope. (R. 16-18 (,rif46-47, 50, & 53); R. 47-48 (,rif46-47, 50, 
& 53).) Citation/Order Number 8559607 to Hecla provided: 
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on April 15, 2011, 
when a miner was struck by falling material while working 
in the 6150-15-3 West stope. A substantial quantity of 
material (measuring approximately 25 feet in width, 7 4 feet 
in length, and 25 feet in height) fell 10 feet from the stope 
back after portions of the supporting pillar were removed to 
extract ore. Ground support was necessary in the stope to 
mine safely, but the ground support utilized was not 
adequate. The ground control was not designed, installed 
and/or maintained in a manner that was capable of 
supporting the ground in such a wide stope when the support 
pillar was removed. Mine management has engaged in 
aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary 
negligence by directing the pillar to be mined as the stope 
advanced and allowing miners to work under inadequate 
support. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a 
mandatory standard. 
(R. 408-409 (Ruff Depo, Exh. 5)(emphasis added).) Additionally, MSHA 
Citation/Order Number 8559607 cited "reckless disregard" by Hecla. (Id.) Another 
of the citations, Citation/Order Number 8559608, stated as follows: 
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on April 15, 2011, 
when a miner was struck by falling material while working 
in the 6150-15-3 West stope. A substantial quantity of 
material (measuring approximately 25 feet in width, 7 4 feet 
in length, and 25 feet in height) fell 10 feet from the stope 
back after portions of a supporting pillar were removed to 
extract ore. Management failed to adequately examine and 
test the ground conditions to determine if additional 
measures needed to be taken. This was necessary due to the 
constantly changing ground conditions, they were mining a 
wide stope and removing the support pillar. The operator 
has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than 
ordinary negligence, as they needed to make examinations 
and conduct tests to ensure that all feasible precautions were 
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taken. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a 
mandatory standard. 
(R. 410-411 (Ruff Depo, Exh. 6)(emphasis added).) Again, MSHA Citation/Order 
Number 8559608 cited "reckless disregard" by Hecla. (Id.) Finally, Citation/Order 
Number 8559609 stated: 
Portions of a supporting pillar were removed to extract ore in 
the 6150-15-3 East stope. The section of removed pillar 
measured approximately 18 to 20 feet wide and was mined 
similar to the 6150-15-3 west stope that resulted in a fatal 
accident when the pillar fell. Ground support was necessary 
in the stope to mine safely, but the ground support utilized 
was not adequate. The ground control was not designed, 
installed and/or maintained in a manner that was capable of 
supporting the ground in such a wide stope when the support 
pillar was removed. Mine management has engaged in 
aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary 
negligence by directing the pillar to be mined as the stope 
advanced and allowing miners to work under inadequately 
supported ground. This is an unwarrantable failure to 
comply with a mandatory standard. 
(R. 412-413 (Ruff Depo, Exh. 7)(emphasis added).) Citation/Order Number 8559609 
cited "high" negligence by Hecla. (Id.) Heda's challenged to the citations were 
heard in a multi-day administrative trial at which numerous witnesses testified. 
(See generally Record Addendum ("R. Adden."), 8-26.) 
On or about November 17, 2011, MSHA issued a "Report of Investigation" on 
the "Fatal Fall of Roof Accident April 15, 2011 Lucky Friday Mine" ("The Report"), 
which report was approved by Wyatt Andrews, District Manager for the Western 
District ofMSHA on November 17, 2011. (R. 18 (ifif57-58); R. 48 (i[i[57-58).) The 
Report stated that: 
The accident occurred because management did not have policies and 
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procedures that provided for the safe mining of split stopes in a multi-
vein deposit. Management failed to design, install, and maintain a 
support system to control the ground in places where miners worked 
and travelled. Additionally management failed to ensure that 
appropriate supervisors or other designated persons examined or 
tested the ground conditions where the fall occurred. 
(R. 426 (Moore Depo, Exh. 25)(emphasis added).) The Report further stated: 
Root Cause: Management did not conduct an evaluation, engineering 
analysis, or risk assessment to determine the structural integrity of 
the stope back. The back that struck the victim was comprised of a 
combination of paste fill and w_aste pillar. As shown on projection 
maps, geologic structure in the form of joints, faults, and fractures 
intersected the waste pillar at various angles. These intersecting 
discontinuities cut the pillar rock mass into angular blocks and wedges 
which facilitated gravity failure. The large blocks and wedges 
observed in the fall rubble were not sufficiently supported by the 6-foot 
long rock bolts installed in the undercut surface of the waste pillar. 
(R. 432 (emphasis added).) The Report also stated: 
Root Cause: Management policies, procedures, and controls failed to 
ensure appropriate supervisors or other designated persons examined 
and tested ground conditions to determine if additional ground control 
measures needed to be taken to ensure the safety of miners prior to 
commencing work in the stope. 
(R. 433 (emphasis added).) 
On April 28, 2015 (after the District Court's initial summary judgment 
decision), the Decision and Order in the MSHA Civil Penalty Proceedings against 
Hecla was entered ("MSHA Order"). (R. Adden., 8-26.) Importantly, the MSHA 
Order outlined the severity of Heda's actions/inaction, including: 
• "Hecla did not present any data, evidence, or test results to demonstrate that 
the horizontal pressures were sufficient to support the ground under these 
conditions. Hecla violated section 57.3360 because it did not design or install 
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a support system adequate to control the ground m the cited area." (R. 
Adden. 17-18.) 
• "I find that the Secretary established that the violation was S&S [Significant 
and Substantial]. A lengthy analysis is not required for this finding. A 
violation occurred that contributed to a discrete safety hazard, a measure of 
danger to safety. The Secretary established that there was a reasonable 
likelihood that the hazard contributed to by the violation would result in an 
event in which there is an injury. The discrete hazard was a fall of ground 
and such a fall was reasonably likely because the pillar was inadequately 
supported." (R. Adden. 18)(emphasis added). 
• "I find that the violation was the result of Heda's reckless disregard and 
unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard. ... Although I do 
not believe that Hecla intentionally risked the lives of miners, I find that 
Hecla should have known that the roof support in 15 west beneath the waste 
pillar would endanger miners and violate section 57 .3360 .... It should have 
been obvious that a large, unsupported rock mass could endangered [sic] 
miners, yet Hecla did not ascertain whether the waste pillar in 15 stope was 
adequately supported." (R. Adden. 19.) 
• "The failure to analyze the risks posed by removing a pillar for a distance of 
75 feet demonstrates aggravated conduct because it shows that Hecla made 
no effort to properly design its ground support in this situation." (Id.) 
• "I reached this conclusion [increasing penalties for two orders from $20,900 to 
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$50,000 each] because of the serious safety hazard created by these violations 
and Hecla's high negligence. Management knew that (1) fractures and faults 
were often present in the host rock; (2) miners were going to undercut the 
pillars for a [sic] considerable distances; (3) undercutting pillars for 
significant distances was not a typical practice in the Gold Hunter section of 
the mine, and ( 4) no engineering study or any other study had been 
undertaken to determine whether its ground support plan would adequately 
support the roof under such conditions." (R. Adden. 24 (emphasis added).) 
• "I find that the Secretary establish [sic] that the civil penalty for Citation No. 
8559607 should be assessed under the Mine Act's flagrant violation provision. 
. . . In the present case, Hecla management had know ledge of the cited 
conditions .... Hecla's management knew that miners were going to undercut 
the pillar for a distance of about 75 feet during cut 3, knew that it was 
unusual for miners to undercut a pillar for such a significant distance in the 
Gold Hunter section of the mine, and knew that no engineering study or any 
other study that had been undertaken to determine whether its existing 
ground support standards would adequately support the roof or the pillar 
under such conditions. Hecla also knew that the rock structure in the host 
rock was subject to faults and fractures in the rock. ... I also conclude that 
the violation substantially and proximately caused the death of Larry 
Marek." (R. Adden. 26)(assessing a civil penalty of $180,000.00)(em.phasis 
added).) 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Mareks identify the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Idaho's worker's 
compensation exclusivity provision (LC. §72-209) barred the Mareks' claims against 
Hecla and thereby granting summary judgment in favor of Hecla; 
2. Whether the District Court erred in holding that the Mareks - rather 
than Hecla - bore the burden of disproving workers' compensation exclusivity on 
summary judgment; 
3. Whether the District Court erred in holding that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact so as to grant summary judgment in favor of Hecla; 
4. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Respondents Baker, 
Jordan, Bayer, Hogamier, Moore, and Stepro were fellow servants immune from 
suit under LC. §72-209; and, 
5. Whether the District Court erred in denying the Mareks' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the District Court's summary judgment decision. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Mareks only seek an award of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While discussion of the facts and law underpinning this appeal requires some 
discussion at length, the core question presented in this appeal is relatively 
straightforward. 
Idaho's workers' compensation law generally provides that workers' 
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compensation 1s the exclusive remedy for workers injured at their places of 
employment. However, that same law provides an exception to that exclusivity, 
"where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or employees[.]" 
The application of this exception has been explored in the past, including in 
Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 760 P.2d 1171 (1988), and DeMoss v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 (1990). In both cases, application of the 
exception was rejected, with this Court generally holding that the employers' 
negligent conduct - in Kearney, missing lawnmower safety equipment, and in 
DeMoss, a lack of asbestos safety measures during a boiler breakup - failed to rise 
to the level that would warrant application of the exception. 
However, Justice Huntley, in writing a concurrence in Kearney, went on to 
outline the kind of conduct that would rise to a level so as to trigger the exception: 
"I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be instances 
where an employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working 
environment would, in my judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression." 
That precise kind of conduct subsequently arose in the case of Dominguez v. 
Evergreen Resources, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 (2005), which involved an employee 
who was directed to wash out a tank contaminated with a cyanide-laced sludge, 
exposing the employee to a poisonous hydrogen cyanide gas, severely and 
permanently injuring the employee. While the employee was entitled to, and 
received, workers' compensation benefits, this Court affirmed the employee's right 
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to advance a lawsuit under the exception. 
The facts presented by this case strongly echo the facts underlying 
Dominguez - recklessly directing an employee to work in a highly dangerous and 
unsafe environment - rather than the facts underlying, e.g., Kearney - employer 
negligence in failing to attach lawnmower safety equipment. Here, Hecla removed 
center pillars from a mining tunnel to a greater extent than had ever been done in 
the mine previously, and did so without any engineering review and approval, 
without a safety review, without additional safety steps being taken, and in the face 
of warnings of a geologist and a senior miner of the hazards of doing so. In fact, the 
risk taken in mining out the pillars was so egregious that, upon finally being shown 
the map of the removals after the rockfall that killed Pete Marek and injured Mike 
Marek, the mine's Chief Engineer said of the pillar removal, "You gotta be fucking 
kidding me." The wholesale failure to employ any safety measures, yet continuing 
to direct miners to work in such a space, ultimately and tragically resulted in the 
death of Pete Marek and the injury of Mike Marek when the roof of the mining 
tunnel suddenly and catastrophically collapsed. 
Further, much like the employer in Dominguez, Hecla flaunted federal safety 
regulations, resulting in multiple citations and, after full-blown litigation, an 
adverse Civil Penalty Proceedings decision from the federal mine oversight agency, 
l\1SHA. MSHA found, for example, that Heda's violation "was the result of Heda's 
reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard," 
and further held that "[i]t should have been obvious that a large, unsupported rock 
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mass could endangered [sic] miners[.]" In light of Heda's conduct, monetary 
penalties were increased in the recent MSHA decision, to the total tune of $280,000. 
The errors of the District Court, discussed herein, ultimately stem from the 
District Court's failure to apply the exclusivity-exception as developed in the 
J{:Qa.r;n~ concurrence and presented in the Dominguez case, instead analogizing this 
matter to the Kearney lawnmower case. As a result, the Distr:i:ct Court failed to 
appropriately consider evidence and law presented by the Mareks, which should 
have resulted in a denial of Heda's motion for summary judgment and a granting of 
the Mareks' own motion for summary judgment. This error was amplified by the 
District Court's failure to reconsider the summary judgment decision following the 
Mareks' motion for reconsideration, which outlined legal and factual errors, and 
further provided the then-newly-issued MSHA decision. 
Simply stated, the Kearney lawnmower case should not guide the decision in 
this matter, involving a massive mine collapse that proved fatal to a miner; instead, 
this case squarely echoes the kind of gross, reckless endangerment of employees 
that should trigger the exclusivity-exception, as discussed in the Kearney 
concurrence and presented in Dominguez. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Summary judgment. 
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment." Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100, 
1101-02 (2002)(citation omitted). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
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favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Id. "Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Id. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law 
remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Id. 
B. Motions for reconsideration. 
"[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration 
following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the 
evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). "We recently 
clarified the standard this Court uses when reviewing a denial of a motion for 
reconsideration[.] ... If the [underlying] decision turned on a question oflaw, we will 
exercise free review." AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 
176, 180 (2013). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred in holding that Idaho's worker's compensation exclusivity 
provision (LC. §72-209) barred the Mareks' claims against Hecla and thereby 
granting summary judgment in favor of Hecla. 
1. The exclusivity-exception and interpretive Idaho case law. 
a. LC. §72-209. 
The exclusivity provision of Idaho's workers' compensation act, I.C. §72-209, 
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provides as follows: 
72-209. EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER. (1) 
Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of 
the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other 
liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, 
legal representatives or assigns. 
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this 
section shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, 
agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety, provided 
that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in any case 
where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful 
or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, 
agents, servants or employees, the loss of such exemption applying 
only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to the employer 
unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a 
party thereto. 
(Emphasis added.) As this matter falls into the exemption to exclusivity provided in 
LC. §72-209(3), the Mareks' action is not barred, and the District Court's granting 
of summary judgment to Hecla was in error. 
b. The Kearney and DeMoss decisions. 
In ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court relied heavily on the Kearney and DeMoss decisions, holding that "Kearney 
and DeMoss demonstrate that knowledge of the dangerous condition alone that 
made it substantially certain that injury would occur does not create an exception to 
exclusivity." (R. 984.) In Kearney, an injured employee attempted to assert a right 
to the exclusivity-exception as the result of her employer's failure to attach certain 
safety devices to a lawnmower. The Court rejected application of the exclusivity-
exception, generally holding that "there must be evidence of some offensive action or 
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hostile attack" and that it is generally "not sufficient to prove that the alleged 
aggressor committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury 
would occur." 114 Idaho at 757. In DeMoss, employees filed suit and attempted to 
assert the exclusivity-exception as the result of exposure to asbestos during a boiler 
removal. 118 Idaho at 177-178. The District Court in this action erred in relying 
upon these cases, as both are readily distinguishable from the instant action. 
In both Kearney and DeMoss, the complained-of conduct paled in comparison 
to the conduct in Dominguez (discussed below), and this action. Both cases involved 
merely simple negligence, rather than the creation of a death trap. In Kearney, for 
example, Justice Huntley, in his concurrence, bluntly noted: "In the instant case 
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the employer knew the employee would 
operate the machine without the grass catcher affixed, which installation would 
have covered the opening in the chassis which exposed the blade." Kearney, 114 
Idaho at 758. In DeMoss, the Court emphasized the initial lack of confirmation over 
whether the substance at issue was asbestos, as well as noting that at least some 
protective equipment was provided post-testing. 118 Idaho at 179 ("The record 
shows further that John Austin, the city welder, told defendant Eastwood that he 
thought the material might be asbestos. The record does not show that Eastwood or 
any of the defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the test results from 
the laboratory were received. These test results were received after the appellants' 
first exposure to the asbestos had occurred. Moreover, while the protective clothing 
provided the workers prior to the second round of removal may indeed have been 
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inadequate, that does not rise to the level of 'unprovoked physical aggression."'). 
Despite the refusal to apply the exclusivity-exception in Kearney and 
DeMoss, the potential application of the exclusivity-exception that lay the 
groundwork for Dominguez - and should apply in this action - can be found in 
Kearney. Concurring in the majority decision in Keamev not to apply the 
exception, Justice Huntley illustrated where the exclusivity-exception would apply: 
I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be 
instances where an employer's knowing ordering of an 
employee into an unsafe working environment would, in my 
judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression. 
The issue is whether conduct which lacks a specific intent to injure can 
properly be termed intentional under the terms of I.C. § 72-209(3). As 
noted by the Court in Jones v. VIP Development, 472 N.E.2d 1046 
(Ohio 1984), 
[A]n intentional tort is an act committed with the intent to 
injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is 
substantially certain to occur. See 1 Restatement of the Law 
2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section SA. We hereby reject the 
proposition that a specific intent to injure is necessary to a 
finding of intentional misconduct. (Emphasis added.) 
1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section SA reads: 
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this 
Subject to denote that the actor desires to ca use consequences 
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it. 
Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 (Huntley, J., concurring specially)(emphasis added). 
C. The Dominguez decision. 
The premonition reflected in Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney 
ultimately came to fruition in the later Dominguez case, where an employee injured 
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in an industrial tank accident brought suit under the exclusivity-exception, despite 
having already recovered under worker's compensation. In explaining the facts of 
the matter, the Court highlighted the risk the employer created for the employee: 
Evergreen owned an eleven by thirty-six-foot 25,000-gallon horizontal 
steel tank (the steel tank). The steel tank had originally been used by 
another company owned by Elias, and was used as part of a cyanide 
leach process to recover silver from precipitator dust. After several 
years of such use, a layer of cyanide-laced sludge formed at the bottom 
of the steel tank. ... 
In the summer of 1996, Elias directed Dominguez and another 
employee to wash out the sludge that had accumulated in the steel 
tank. Dominguez alleges Elias knew it was hazardous to enter the 
steel tank, but concealed that knowledge from Dominguez. Contrary to 
federal regulations, no confined space entry permit had been prepared, 
there had been no special employee training, appropriate safety 
equipment was not provided, and no attendant was standing by. The 
two employees entered the steel tank through a manhole opening on 
the top of the tank, and using a water hose and broom the pair 
attempted to wash the sludge out through a small opening. While in 
the steel tank, Dominguez was overcome by poisonous hydrogen 
cyanide gas and lost consciousness. The other employee was able to 
escape. 
Although near death when he was extracted, Dominguez survived. 
Having absorbed significant quantities of cyanide, Dominguez suffered 
severe and irreversible brain damage. 
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9-10. The employee applied for and received workers' 
compensation benefits, but then subsequently sued his employer under the 
exclusivity-exception. Id. The employer defaulted (resulting in a $23,400,000 
judgment) but then subsequently appealed, arguing that the claim could not be both 
an "accident" for purposes of workers' compensation and an "intentional tort" for 
purposes of meeting the exclusivity-exception. Id. at 10-11. The Court rejected the 
employer's argument: 
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Contrary to the Employer's assertions, injury in the course of 
employment and injury as the result of an intentional act are not 
mutually exclusive. As a matter of common sense, an employee can be 
harmed while working, whether that harm is the result of negligence 
or design. Even if an employer commits an intentional tort against an 
employee, it does not follow that the tort necessarily arose outside of 
the employment context, or that the employee was acting outside the 
course of his employment at the time of injury. 
An injury can be "accidental" from the perspective of an employee 
while at the same time being intentional on the part of the employer. 
The worker's compensation law defines an "injury" as "a personal 
injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of any 
employment covered by the worker's compensation law." LC. § 72-
102(17)(a). In turn, an "accident" is defined as "an unexpected, 
undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected 
with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably 
located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an 
injury." LC. § 72-102(17)(b). From Dominguez's perspective, the injury 
that befell him was an accident under the statutory definition. In 
cleaning out the sludge at the bottom of the steel tank, Dominguez did 
not intend to be overcome by hydrogen cyanide gas. His injury was an 
untoward event, connected to the industry in which it occurred, which 
can be reasonably located as to time and place. It is no contradiction 
for Dominguez's [sic] to maintain he suffered an accident covered by 
worker's compensation and at the same time argue he was harmed by 
the Employer's intentional acts. 
In this case, Dominguez has alleged a willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression by his employer, and therefore his claim falls into a 
statutory exception to the exclusive remedy rule. LC. § 72-209(3). 
Consequently, Dominguez is permitted to collect those worker's 
compensation benefits for which he is eligible and to bring a cause of 
action against his employer outside the worker's compensation system. 
Id.; Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at 1173. 
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11-12. 
The District Court in this action first erred in attempting to distinguish 
Dominguez by ruling that "it is not alleged that Defendants directed Pete and Mike 
into a dangerous environment, it has not been alleged that Defendants knew that 
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the environment was hazardous, and it has not been alleged that Defendants 
hampered or impeded rescue efforts." (R. 980.) While the Complaint and facts set 
forth by the Mareks squarely rebut this holding (see generally, e.g., R. 19-21 (ifif 62-
71) & R. 72-79),5 this reading of Dominguez is errantly predicated on the 
assumption that the employer in Domjn!Yuez (and in Kearney and DeMoss) actively 
and intentionally sought to injure the harmed employees. The District Court later 
repeats this error in holding that "Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence 
that Defendants harbored any ill will toward Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs 
put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to cause injury or death to 
Plaintiffs." (R. 984.) However, as explained in the In re Elias decision (a District of 
Idaho bankruptcy decision related to the events of Dominguez), it is not merely a 
question of a subjective intent to harm a particular employee or a belief that harm 
was substantially certain to occur, but acting with a harmful state of mind such as 
to willfully disregard the potential for harm: 
Regarding the "willful" element, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's 
state court complaint establishes that Defendant acted with 
the requisite subjective intent in sending Defendant into the 
toxic environment of the tank car .... 
Effectively, to recover outside the Worker's Compensation system, a 
claimant must prove that the employer committed an intentional act of 
aggression against the claimant which caused an injury. And as 
mentioned above, to recover an award of punitive damages, the state 
5 The Mareks did not contend that there was any effort by Hecla to hamper or impede rescue efforts. 
However, this observation by the District Court, in contrasting Dominguez, offers nothing, as the 
injuries suffered by the Mareks resulted from the rockfall itself, and were not caused by or 
exacerbated by the rescue efforts, unlike Dominguez. See 142 Idaho at 10 ("When firefighters 
arrived on the scene they cut through the steel tank in order to pull Dominguez out. Elias was 
allegedly uncooperative with rescue and medical workers, refusing to accurately identify the 
material in the steel tank and thereby hampering Dominguez's rescue and treatment.") 
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court must conclude that the defendant possessed an extremely 
harmful state of mind and have acted with an understanding of, or 
disregard for, the likely consequences of his or her acts. Cheney, 665 
P.2d at 669. 
In this case the default judgment against Defendant can be fairly read 
as establishing that when Defendant sent Plaintiff into the tank car, 
he acted with a harmful state of mind and that in doing so, 
Defendant either understood, or knowingly disregarded, the 
likely consequences of Plaintiff's entry into a confined space 
containing harmful chemicals, with little or no ventilation and 
no safety equipment. Stated differently, the state court judgment, 
although employing somewhat different language, preclusively 
establishes that the allegations of the complaint are true, and that 
Defendant acted with a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff, or that he 
believed that harm was substantially certain to occur. Any semantic 
differences notwithstanding, considering the Idaho courts' 
interpretation of the phrase "wilful act of physical aggression," 
together with its rulings concerning the mental state necessary to 
support an award of punitive damages, the state court's default 
judgment conclusively establishes that Defendant, while 
harboring an extremely harmful state of mind, committed an 
act of wilful physical aggression against Plaintiff. 
In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (emphases added). More 
bluntly stated, an employer cannot create a deathtrap and escape liability by 
claiming that it did not intend to specifically harm that particular employee in a 
specific fashion. Nothing in any of the Dominguez cases suggest that Elias was "out 
to get" Scott Dominguez, or to deliberately trap him in a cloud of cyanide gas -
rather, Elias disregarded the plain risk posed to any employee, including the other 
employees endangered by his nonchalant treatment of a tank full of cyanide sludge, 
as summarized by the Ninth Circuit: 
At AEI, Elias had used the thirty-six-foot-long, eleven-foot-high tank 
as a storage tank for byproducts of a cyanide leaching process he had 
patented. Elias realized that his process resulted in the transfer of 
cyanide-laced solids into the tank. He admitted, moreover, that there 
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were one to two tons of cyanide-laced sludge left in the tank when he 
shipped it to Evergreen in the early 1990s. This sludge did not 
preclude Elias from using the tank for some purposes. In 1996, 
however, Elias decided that the sludge, which was hardened and more 
than a foot deep, had to be cleaned out of the tank before he could store 
the sulfuric acid in it. 
On August 26, 1996, Elias ordered four of his employees, Bryan Smith, 
Gene Thornock, Darrin Weaver, and Scott Dominguez, to enter the 
tank and wash the sludge out a valve opening in the end. Despite 
Smith's repeated requests, Elias failed to provide any safety equipment 
for this task. Consequently, Dominguez and Weaver entered the tank 
wearing only their regular work clothes. After about fifteen minutes, 
they realized that the sludge could not be washed out the small hole in 
the end of the tank, and they exited. Both complained of sore throats 
and nasal passages. 
The next morning, on August 27, 1996, Elias met with his employees, 
who told him of the difficulties of the day before and the health effects 
they suffered. Smith again insisted on the necessary safety equipment. 
Elias said he would get it, but told his employees to proceed anyway 
and that he expected the tank to be cleaned out that morning. 
Although he instructed his employees to "do it by the book," Elias 
provided none of the safety equipment or training needed for them to 
do so. 
After cutting a bigger hole in the end of the tank, Dominguez and 
Weaver again entered the tank with no safety equipment. About 45 
minutes later, after they had emptied about one-third of the sludge 
through the hole onto the ground, Weaver shouted that Dominguez 
had collapsed. Thornock and Smith unsuccessfully tried to get 
Dominguez out of the tank, which had only a 22-inch manhole at the 
top. When firefighters got to Dominguez, he was in severe respiratory 
distress and in danger of dying. 
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir.), as modified (Dec. 21, 2001), 
supplemented, 27 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the In Re Elias decision's key 
recognition that "[d]efendant either understood, or knowingly disregarded, the 
likely consequences of Plaintiffs entry into a confined space containing harmful 
chemicals, with little or no ventilation and no safety equipment" squarely frames 
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the kind of conduct required to trigger the exclusivity-exception. Accord 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 1 (2010)("A person acts with 
the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of 
producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is 
substantially certain to result .... Comment E: In those occupational-injury cases in 
which courts have applied the substantial-certainty test, there generally is a 
localized job-site hazard, which threatens harm to a small number of identifiable 
employees during a relatively limited period of time."). 
The District Court further erred by holding that Dominguez was 
distinguishable, procedurally, merely because it arose from a default. (R. 980.) 
While the Dominguez judgment was the result of a default, the deemed-true 
allegations must still be sufficient to state a legal claim that supports a judgment. 
Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 37, 720 P.2d 217, 220 (Ct. App. l986)(cited in 
Dominguez)("On appeal, a defaulted defendant may not challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence in a default judgment, he may only contest the sufficiency of the 
complaint and its allegations to support the judgment."); see also Holladay v. 
Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 772, 152 P.3d 638, 643 (Ct. App. 2006)("0n default, 'all well 
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted,' and therefore, if 
the complaint sufficiently alleges facts upon which the plaintiff would be entitled to 
damages, the plaintiff may recover those damages without proving any additional 
facts.")(internal citation omitted); Johnson v. State, 112 Idaho 1112, 1114-1115, 739 
P.3d 411, 413-414 (Ct. App. 1987)("[T]he court may consider the merits of the 
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underlying cause of action in determining whether entry of default is appropriate."); 
accord, generally, lOA Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2688 (3d 
ed.)("Even after default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the 
unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default 
does not admit mere conclusions of law."). 
2. The Exclusivity-Exception applies in this matter. and the Mareks 
should have been granted summary judgment on this issue. 
In light of the framework set out in the Kearney concurrence and its 
subsequent application in Dominguez, the facts of this case make clear that the 
Mareks are entitled to application of the exclusivity-exception. 
The mining projections at issue, calling for the extensive undermining of the 
pillar that led to this tragedy, was made by Lead Production Geologist Bruce Cox. 
(R. 451-452 & 482-487 (Cox Depo, 11. 40:24-42:6 & Exh. 57).) In his interview with 
MSHA, Mr. Cox explained why the cuts were to be taken: 
Q. Why were the Mo pillars in 15 and 12 undercut? 
A. to gain more of Lhe better grade _material of ore, in 15-3, to drop the ,n vein off and 
mine the 30 and. 40 veins together, ... tal:e that ore and drop th¢ waste off th(! North side V 
Q. it W<lS WilSte, in the VCrticru sense? 'J11c::. pil lcp, it'(<:<;, '<1 c~::, f- <- .(.o, ~ -t=. 6 "''"-1$ fil--
A, yes <111..{ •10,v vJ'c +ct!::.c i+ <'(_-:; c..-c. 
(R. 484.) Mr. Cox also explained the general process for review and approval of a 
mining plan: 
6 The mining plans implemented begin as a "mining projection" created by the Geology department, 
outlining where and how the mining is to take place, and take into account the mining done in the 
immediately preceding cut above. 
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Q. how does your job as a geologist rrffe-ct the decisions co t1.kc pillars? 
A. my 'Nork unrlPr&ronnd doesn't anticipate u.ridercutling pillars. my work anticipates 
mining the best v.nluc material, and \Ve make those reconunendations to opcrntions ... 
Q. rou identify the ore, and someone else determines how lo mine it? 
A. yes. 
Roet~rs: Q. who muke.s that decision, the final decision? 
A. I don't knov1, it's not geology, 
Rogers: Q. so it's either en~-ineering, or operations? \'\'ho is operations? who sits in? 
A. typical meeting is Thursday morning, development meeting, we have mine GF, 
mine superi1:tenden:, SOJR.~JJ~R?~tk~~ing, someone fr~m geolo1:?, someone 
from safety, same thing Wedrn:!~ays, what \Ve cail the supervisors meeting, plans to 
mine stopes are discussed then 5J:t.c,.-
Rogers: Q. typical group? 
(Id.) Mine Superintendent Doug Bayer testified that he reviewed and approved the 
mining plan at issue. (R. 495 (Bayer Depo, 11. 9:8-9:16).) Chief Geologist Terry 
DeVoe explained that the decision to remove the pillar at issue was an economic 
one: 
21 MR. HAVAS: Q Stated more simply, the decision to 
22 mine through the pillar, to take the pillar and 
23 undermine it above, was an economic decision. 
24 A One of the components of that decision was 
25 economic, yes. But not the only -- I mean -- it's a 
1 long-term plan. 
2 Q Your answer was "Based on economics?" 
3 "Yes." 
4 That was your answer then. And you stand by 
5 your statement; correct? 
6 A Yes. 
(R. 575-576 & 686 (De Voe Depo, 11. 97:21-98:6 & Depo. Exh. 64).) Numerous willful 
deficiencies in the process of approving the pillar removal, and having the Mareks 
work in the dangerous stope, are readily identifiable: 
• No engineer review and approval was secured. Heda's Chief Engineer, 
Ron Krusemark, did not see the pillar removal plans until the date of, and after, the 
collapse. (R. 532 (Krusemark Depo, 11. 12:5-12); accord, R. 452 & 489 (Cox Depo, 11. 
42:15-43:13 & Exh. 58).) At deposition, Mr. Krusemark testified as to his shock on 
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reviewing the stope map (for the first time post-cut) in response to the collapse: 
6 Q When the map was presented to you and you 
7 looked at it, what did you see? What stood out to you? 
8 A I asked Scott [Hogamier, Safety Foreman], I asked him, "Where is 
he at?" 
9 He pointed here. 
10 And I looked at it. And I had to -- it took me 
11 a few seconds to digest what the map said. And I just 
12 looked across the table at -- you know, and across the 
13 table was [Mine General Manager] John Jordan. I don't know what he --
if he 
14 was on the phone or what he was doing. But I just 
15 looked at him and I said, "You gotta be fucking kidding 
16 me." 
17 Q What was the reaction? 
18 A He looked over at the map, and he saw what I 
19 was pointing to, and he just leaned back and went "Oh, 
20 God." 
21 Q And to what were you referring? 
22 A I was referring to the pillar. The map 
23 indicates that they were directed to mine the pillar 
24 out. 
25 Q And you had a reaction to that why? 
1 A First of all, I didn't know anything about it. 
2 And, you know, I didn't know what they had done to abate 
3 the very high potential for failure. 
4 And I was quite suspicious -- I mean I just 
5 knew -- I mean I could look at the map and I could see 
6 where the face was at, what part of the pillar had been 
7 mined out. And I could just imagine in my mind that it 
8 was a huge pile of rock. 
(R. 34 (Krusemark Depo, 11. 18:6-19:S)(emphasis added). Mr. Krusemark further 
indicated that, had it been presented to him, the plan for pillar removal (as was 
ultimately performed) would not have been approved, being devoid of any ground 
support plan: 
24 Q You testified previously that had you been 
25 consulted about the mine plan that's shown in Exhibit 
1 33, you would not have approved it without a tested, 
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2 designed, engineered ground support plan; correct? 
3 A That's still my stance, yes. 
4 Q And the ground support plan that was in 
5 existence at the time wasn't engineered specifically for 
6 the circumstances that were found in Cut 3 of the 615[0]-15 
7 stope where it undermined the pillar, was it? 
8 A Yes. I guess if that's -- I agree, and I --
9 there's -- what you've just said, I agree with. 
10 Q You described it as way outside of the norm, 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And I believe you said in your testimony that 
13 it wasn't that there wasn't compliance with the ground 
14 support plan. It was that there was no ground support 
15 plan for this configuration. 
16 A That's correct. 
(R. 535 (Krusemark Depa, 11. 24:24-25:16)(emphasis added); accord R. 676 & 687 
(De Voe Depa, 11. 98:7-21 & Depa. Exh. 64).) 
Further exacerbating the lack of engineering review was the fact that the 
extent of the pillar removal in the 6150-15 stope was greater than had ever been 
done before in the mine. (See, e.g., R. 717-718 (Lund Depa, 11. 13:18-14:13); R. 500 
(Bayer Depa, 11. 26:24-28:4).) Despite this, Hecla did not have a full-time rock 
mechanics engineer until after the collapse, and no outside consultant was utilized 
to evaluate the pillar removal. (R. 511 (Bayer Depo, 11. 72:6-21); R. 451 (Cox Depo, 
11. 39:6-40:23); R. 659 (De Voe Depo, at 11. 32:25-33:2); R. 693 (Jordan Depo, 11. 14:14-
15:5); R. 725 (Lund Depo, at 11. 43:13-18).) 
• Safety review and safety steps were not undertaken. Although Hecla's 
Safety Foreman, Scott Hogamier observed the pillar removal and had "never 
personally done anything like that, removing any pillars," he was not involved in 
the decision to remove the pillars at issue, and did not review the mining plans 
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regarding removal of the pillar. (R. 551-554 (Hogamier Depo, 11. 19:25-23:22; 25:25-
29:12-30:24).) As an additional complication, the west stope was blasted wider 
than intended; however, no additional support (such as timbering) was installed or 
even considered in conjunction with the pillar removal. (R. 453-454 (Cox Depo, 11. 
49:10-50:17); R. 517 (Bayer Depo, 11. 964-12).) 
• Hecla received warning about the removal of the pillars. Former 
employees of Hecla have testified that they specifically raised concerns about 
removal of the pillars. Tim Ruff, former production geologist for Hecla, testified 
that he attempted to raise the issue on multiple occasions, only to be rebuffed. For 
example, he testified that his efforts to raise the issue with Mine Superintendent 
Doug Bayer were disregarded: 
15 Q. (BY MR. HAVAS) So is that when you had 
16 this conversation with Mr. Bayer in his office? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Tell us about that conversation, who was 
19 present and what was discussed? 
20 A. It was just he and I present, and I might 
21 have seen him in the hall, he may have requested 
22 that I bring those maps for him to see. But at any 
23 rate, whether he asked or not, I gathered up the 
24 maps, brought them down to his office and Doug was 
25 always -- his door was always open, and I brought 
1 'em in and showed them to him, and he contemplated 
2 the whole thing again. And finally he said, well, 
3 this is what De Voe wants, and just kind of shrugged 
4 his shoulders, like, it's out of my hands, you 
5 know. 
6 Q. Did you understand what he meant by, this 
7 is what De Voe wants? 
8 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. (BY MR. HA VAS) What did you understand 
11 it to mean? 
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12 A. That they had made up their minds to take 
13 this pillar out, come hell or high water. And I 
14 still don't quite understand, I would have thought 
15 that Doug, being the mine superintendent, would 
16 have been able to override -- and him being an 
17 engineer, would have been able to override anything 
18 Terry said, but Terry's a pretty strong personality 
19 and pretty forceful, and he may have just convinced 
20 him that this is the best thing to do, and --
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
22 Q. (BY MR. HAVAS) He told you, this is what 
23 De Voe wants? 
24A. Right. 
(R. 242-243 & 402-407 (Ruff Depo, 11. 151:15-152:24 & Depo. Exh. 3).) Mr. Ruff had 
no more success with Chief Production Geologist Bruce Cox or Chief Mine Geologist 
Terry De Voe: 
6 Q. Your summary goes on to say, from that 
7 point on you tried to convince Bruce and Terry --
8 and again that's Bruce Cox and Terry DeVoe? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. -- almost daily to reconsider before it's 
11 too late until they began to get angry with you. 
12 Tell us about that, to the extent you haven't 
13 already. How -- how was the communication between 
14 you and Bruce and Terry daily? How did that come 
15 up? What happened? Who said what? 
16 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, hearsay, compound. 
17 Go ahead. 
18 A. Well, a lot of times, mostly I talked to 
19 Bruce because we were in the same office and I'd 
20 come up after -- excuse me -- after coming up from 
21 underground and I'd just tell him, Bruce, you know, 
22 this ain't a good idea. You should see that thing. 
23 And little by little -- you know, first 
24 he'd just tell me, well, you know, this is what 
25 we're gonna do and it'll be all right, and later he 
1 started to get a little short. 
2 And actually the first time I had really 
3 ever heard Bruce raise his voice was during one of 
4 those conversations, he just flat told me that --
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5 you know, just drop it, forget it, you know, this 
6 is what we're gonna do, you know. 
7 Q. (BY MR. HA VAS) You had conversations 
8 with Terry De Voe of a similar nature? 
9 A. Yes, a couple. 
10 Q. Where did those take place? 
11 A. One in the -- one in the hall, and he 
12 told me too, you know, when I brought it up again, 
13 and he was already getting a little -- a little 
14 short, and he said, just drop it, this is what's 
15 gonna happen, get over it, you know, and walked 
16 into his office. 
(R. 244-245 (Ruff Depo, 11. 153:6-154:16).) Mr. Ruff further testified that he also 
spoke with a couple of shift bosses and Mine Foreman John Lund, but "their 
reaction universally is, well, I'm just doing my job, you know, that this is what the 
bosses want and this is my job is to see that they get it." (R. 245-246, 11. 154: 17-
155:4).) Mr. Ruff was particularly concerned that the removal of the pillar in 6150-
15 would, as a result, leave the pillar in the previously-mined area above hanging 
free in space with no support. (R. 209-213 & 402-407 (Ruff Depo, 11. 118:20-122:9 & 
Depo. Exh. 3).) 
Similarly, Danny McGillis, a former Hecla "Sugar Daddy" miner7 with 38 
years of service with Hecla, testified that he'd never worked anywhere where a 
pillar had been removed to that extent, and that he had attempted to address the 
issue with Doug Bayer: 
20 A Between shifts we always talk to each other, 
21 you know, the people that are coming off, that came up 
22 from underground, and the people that are replacing them 
7 As explained by Mr. McGillis in his deposition, a "Sugar Daddy" is "somebody that has -- well, they 
put a job up for bid, and the person that gets that bid is the one that has the most seniority and is 
qualified to do the job. So in turn, he gets a bid, gets a job, and he picks the people that he wants to 
work with." (R. 571 (McGillis Depo, 11. 9: 15-20).) 
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23 and going back under. 
24 And this one particular day, Eric Tester come 
25 up to me, and he says, "Boy, Dan, we -- I was bolting, 
1 and the whole back started to dribble." 
And what that indicates, when it starts 
dribbling all over, small pieces falling off the back, 
2 
3 
4 it indicates that the ground is weakening and there's a 
5 good possibility of a cave-in. 
6 He said it dribbled for a while and then it 
7 quit. 
8 So at that time, it -- I had been concerned 
9 before, but at that time I really got concerned. I went 
10 to Doug Bayer, and told him, I says, "Doug, boy, we got 
11 to do something different." I explained the story to 
12 him that Eric had told me about the dribbling. 
13 "And we just -- we really got to do something 
14 different. 11 
15 His reply to me was that "I will look into it, 
16 and possibly maybe next cut we'll do something 
17 different." 
18 At that time, I went on to kind of explain 
19 maybe a couple things we could possibly do now to maybe 
20 put stulls[SJ in underneath the pillar. And he said, 
21 "We'll look into it." And that was -- it was a very 
22 short conversation. 
23 But that was about it. And then I went on my 
24 way to go to work. 
(R. 575 (McGillis Depo, 11. 23:20-24:24.) 
• Hecla placed the Mareks directly into danger, as they performed 
work within the normal scope of their duties. Hecla contended it did not send 
the Mareks into a dangerous place, because the Mareks were given tasks in the 
spray chambers in the slot since the stopes were muck-bound. It was alleged, and 
facts establish, that the Mareks were ordered to work in a dangerous environment. 
(See generally, R. 15-23 Cirif 30-39, 4 7-55, 57-70, 78, & 84).) In summary judgment 
briefing, the Mareks highlighted the testimony of multiple employees/miners 
8 "Stulls" are platforms or columns, usually of timber, set for additional support to the mine roof. 
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regarding the issue, including that of Mike Marek, Doug Bayer, Dale Stepro, George 
Houchin, and Dan McGillis, regarding the scope of work performed by Mike and 
Pete Marek on the date of the rockfall. This testimony, in summary, established 
that the Mareks' work area was the entire 6150-15 stope not just the slot - and 
that the tasks being performed, including watering down the muck piles in the 
stopes, were standard work duties. (See generally R. 835-841; R. 618 (Houchin 
Depo, 11. 23:8-18); R. 593-594 (McGillis Depo, 11. 97:25-98:9); R. 636 & 647-649 
(Stepro Depo, 11. 35:4-37:12 & Depo. Exh. 15); R. 123-124 (Ruff Depo, 11. 32:25-33:3); 
R. 884-885 (MSHA proceeding testimony, Mike Marek, 11. 309:21-310:18); R. 512-
513 (Bayer Depo, 11. 77:13-79:12)(A: I don't believe either miner did anything wrong 
as to being in the -- in the stope or whatnot.")); R. 636 (Stepro Depo, 11. 34:1-25 & 
36:19-37:12); R. 618 (Houchin Depo, 11. 23:8-18); R. 594 & 608 (McGillis Depo, 11. 
98:5-9 &155:2-156:11).) It was anticipated and foreseen and, indeed, expected as 
a matter of normal mining practice that they would work in the stope. As 
experienced, capable miners and within their work assignment, the Mareks could 
and did exercise their judgment as to the work to be done in the stope, including 
preparing the stope for mucking, reduction of dust, cooling, etc. by spraying down 
the muck. The testimony revealed that this was a normal part of the Mareks' 
mining work, in their assigned area, for which there was no criticism, and the 
question should not focus too narrowly on the spray chamber versus the stope as the 
area of work at the precise moment this tragedy occurred. Defendants created the 
unreasonable risk of death and injury in undercutting the pillar in that stope, then 
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sent its crews to work in the stope. Crews worked in the stope under the undercut 
pillar before the fateful day, and would have again following it had the massive rock 
fall not occurred right then. The Mareks were sent to the 6150-15 stope and 
subjected to the avoidable hazard of the undercut pillar, irrespective of whether in 
conjunction ,,,ith that assignment they ~l1crc to \vork in the spray chamber, on 
maintenance tasks, or the stope itself. At a minimum, the scope of the work the 
Marks were assigned on April 15, 2011, was a genuine issue of material fact, 
precluding summary judgment for Hecla. 
• Hecla was significantly sanctioned by MSHA. On April 28, 2015, 
following the District Court's summary judgment decision, the Decision and Order 
in the MSHA Civil Penalty Proceeding against Hecla was entered ("MSHA Order"). 
(R. Adden. 8-26.) Importantly, the MSHA Order outlined the severity of Heda's 
actions/inaction, including: 
o "Hecla did not present any data, evidence, or test results to 
demonstrate that the horizontal pressures were sufficient to support 
the ground under these conditions. Hecla violated [30 C.F.R.] section 
57.3360 because it did not design or install a support system adequate 
to control the ground in the cited area." (R. Adden. 17-18.) 
o "I find that the Secretary established that the violation was S&S 
[Significant and Substantial]. A lengthy analysis is not required for 
this finding. A violation occurred that contributed to a discrete safety 
hazard, a measure of danger to safety. The Secretary established that 
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there was a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to by the 
violation would result in an event in which there is an injury. The 
discrete hazard was a fall of ground and such a fall was reasonably 
likely because the pillar was inadequately supported." (R. Adden. 
18)(emphasis added). 
o "I find that the violation was the result of Heda's reckless disregard 
and unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard. . .. 
Although I do not believe that Hecla intentionally risked the lives of 
miners, I find that Hecla should have known that the roof support in 
15 west beneath the waste pillar would endanger miners and violate 
section 57.3360. ... It should have been obvious that a large, 
unsupported rock mass could endangered [sic] miners, yet Hecla did 
not ascertain whether the waste pillar in 15 stope was adequately 
supported." (R. Adden. 19.) 
o "The failure to analyze the risks posed by removmg a pillar for a 
distance of 75 feet demonstrates aggravated conduct because it shows 
that Hecla made no effort to properly design its ground support in this 
situation." (Id.) 
o "I reached this conclusion [increasing penalties for two orders from 
$20,900 to $50,000 each] because of the serious safety hazard created 
by these violations and Hecla's high negligence. Management knew 
that (1) fractures and faults were often present in the host rock; (2) 
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mmers were gomg to undercut the pillars for a [sic] considerable 
distances; (3) undercutting pillars for significant distances was not a 
typical practice in the Gold Hunter section of the mine, and (4) no 
engineering study or any other study had been undertaken to 
determine whether its ground support plan would adequately support 
the roof under such conditions." (R. Adden. 24 (emphasis added).) 
o "I find that the Secretary establish [sic] that the civil penalty for 
Citation No. 8559607 should be assessed under the Mine Act's flagrant 
violation provision .... In the present case, Hecla management had 
knowledge of the cited conditions .... Heda's management knew that 
miners were going to undercut the pillar for a distance of about 75 feet 
during cut 3, knew that it was unusual for miners to undercut a pillar 
for such a significant distance in the Gold Hunter section of the mine, 
and knew that no engineering study or any other study that had been 
undertaken to determine whether its existing ground support 
standards would adequately support the roof or the pillar under such 
conditions. Hecla also knew that the rock structure in the host rock 
was subject to faults and fractures in the rock .... I also conclude that 
the violation substantially and proximately caused the death of Larry 
Marek." (R. Adden. 26)(emphasis added)(assessing a civil penalty of 
$180,000.00).) 
These findings, entered after a fully and fairly litigated dispute in which Hecla, 
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through counsel, presented contrary testimony and argument in an adversarial 
proceeding, more than support that, like Elias, Hecla "acted with a harmful state of 
mind and that in doing so, [ ] either understood, or knowingly disregarded, the 
likely consequences of' having miners work in an area rendered unsafe by Heda's 
own actions and failures to address the appalling lack of safety. (In re Elias, 302 
B.R. at 912.) This squarely places it within the exception to workers' compensation 
exclusivity. 
In the face of overwhelming evidence that Hecla had knowledge of a potential 
back failure in the 6150-15 stope, but nonetheless sent the Mareks into that area to 
work, with certain knowledge that injury would result from back failure and the 
catastrophic fall of rock it would entail, Hecla cannot carry its burden in supporting 
this affirmative defense. The Mareks are entitled to summary judgment thereon 
and the District Court erred in finding otherwise. 
2. The District Court erred in holding that the Mareks - rather than Hecla -
bore the burden regarding workers' compensation exclusivity on summary 
judgment. 
The question of workers' compensation exclusivity in this action arose as an 
affirmative defense asserted by Hecla: 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff Mike Marek and the plaintiffs' decedent Larry "Pete" 
Marek were employees of defendant Hecla Limited at the time of and 
in connection with the matters alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-209, and other law or statute, plaintiffs' exclusive 
remedy is limited to the remedies set forth in Idaho's Worker's 
Compensation Law, Idaho Code §72-1-1, et seq. 
(R. 51.) 
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In the context of affirmative defenses, "a nonmoving defendant has the 
burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for summary 
judgment." Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491 
(2009)(emphasis added); accord Fuhriman v. State, Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 
803, 1113 P .3d 480, 483 (2007)("An affirmative defense is '[a] defendant's assertion 
raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or 
prosecution's claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true'. Immunity from 
third party suit as a statutory employer fits within this definition of affirmative 
defense. Even if all the allegations in Appellants' complaint are true-that the State 
is liable in tort for the death and injury of several construction workers-the State 
raises the argument and supporting facts that it is protected by I.C. § 72-223 
because it is a statutory employer, and that would defeat Appellants' claim. 
Therefore, we hold immunity through qualification as a statutory employer is an 
affirmative defense.")(internal citation omitted). 
The District Court's holding, that the Kearney decision instead placed the 
burden on the Mareks, ignores that the subsequent Idaho Supreme Court decision 
in Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141 Idaho 524, 112 P.3d 812 (2005), decided almost two 
decades after Kearney, instructs otherwise. In Roe, in a suit against Albertson's 
regarding the statutory rape of an underage employee by an assistant manager, 
"Albertson's denied responsibility, asserting several defenses including that the 
Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law precluded recovery." Roe, 141 Idaho at 527. 
In moving for summary judgment, this Court made clear that it was defendant 
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Albertson's burden to show that the claimed injury fell within the scope of workers' 
comp exclusivity: 
Albertson's, as the moving party, must show there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact that Doe would have been covered by worker's 
compensation and that it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Eligibility under worker's compensation requires a showing 
that the injury vms caused by an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment. Therefore, Albertsons must demonstrate Doe 
suffered an injury covered by workers compensation. 
Roe, 141 Idaho at 530 (emphasis added)(internal citation omitted). The Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Roe makes clear, then, that the burden should have 
fallen on Hecla to prove exclusivity as an affirmative defense even as the 
nonmoving party and a fortiori where, as here, it was also the moving defendant as 
to its own summary judgment motion predicated on the same affirmative defense. 
Accordingly, the District Court's Summary Judgment Decision, predicated in 
part on improper assignment of burden, should be reversed. 
B. The District Court erred in holding that there were no disputed issues of material 
fact in granting summary judgment in favor of Hecla. 
In ruling upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court erred in narrowly construing the workers' compensation exclusivity 
exception, as discussed above. Specifically, the District Court held that "Plaintiffs 
have failed to put forth any evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will toward 
Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted 
to cause injury or death to Plaintiffs," and, as such, "the Court finds that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether Idaho \Vorker's 
Compensation provides Plaintiffs their exclusive remedy." (R. 973.) 
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As discussed above, while this narrow evaluation of facts flows frorn an 
incorrectly narrow reading of the Kearney and J)eMoss decisions (and demands 
facts that are not present m the later Dominguez cases), the District Court does, in 
fact, acknowledge the presence of disputed facts in this matter which it did not take 
into consideration in making its ruling: "The Court finds that while there may be 
some disputed facts in the case at bar, such as whether Defendants received 
warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it was necessary 
for the chief engineer to approve the mining plan, those disputed facts are not 
material[.]" (R. 973)(emphasis in original). 
While the Mareks certainly contend the facts regarding Heda's knowledge 
and conduct are sufficiently established so as to warrant summary judgment in 
favor of the Mareks, at a minimum, such "disputed" facts should have precluded 
summary judgment being granted in favor of Hecla. As such, reversal and remand 
are appropriate. 
C. The District Court erred in holding that Respondents Baker, Jordan, Bayer, 
Hogamier, Moore, and Stepro were fellow servants immune from suit under I.C. 
§72-209. 
In further granting Heda's motion for summary judgment, and denying the 
Mareks', the District Court erred in holding that the individually-named defendants 
"were fellow servants of Pete and Mike, and are therefore immune from liability 
under I.C. §72-209." (R. 97 4.) 
In making that ruling, the District Court briefly held that the "according to 
the plain language of I.C. §72-209, the exception from liability ... also extends to 
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officer[s], agents, servants, or employees of the employer." (Jd.)9 For the reasons 
discussed above, summary judgment in favor of Hecla (and denial of summary 
judgment in the Mareks' favor) is not supported by the facts and case law in this 
matter as were presented and argued on summary judgment. Accordingly, for that 
reason, and as the District Court provided no other factual or legal basis for such 
ruling, the decision of the District Court on this point should also be reversed and 
remanded. 
D. The District Court erred in denying the Marcks' Motion for Reconsideration of the 
District Court's summary judgment decision. 
Following the District Court's summary judgment decision, the Mareks 
moved for reconsideration, highlighting three areas: 1) a mistake of law as to which 
party bore the burden on summary judgment; 2) the Mareks' scope of work on the 
date of the rockfall; and 3) the MSHA Decision, issued after the summary judgment 
determination by the Court. (R. Adden. 29-35.) Following briefing, the District 
Court denied the motion for reconsideration from the bench. (Transcript, August 
18, 2015 ("2nd Tr."), 11. 24:21-28:6.) 
As to the Mareks' first point, the District Court confirmed its prior holding 
9 This is apparently in reference to §72-209(3), which provides: 
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend 
to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees of the 
employer or surety, provided that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in 
any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or employees, the 
loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to 




that the Mareks bore the burden on summary judgment. (Id., 11. 27:10-14.). As 
discussed above, however, this ruling is legally erroneous and should be reversed. 
As to the scope of work, the District Court generally agreed that the Mareks 
were within the scope of their work in being in the area of the stope at issue, but 
held that it did not matter under the District Court's reading of Kearney: 
With respect to the argument by the plaintiffs that the general duty 
assignment to that stope was sufficient to constitute an authorization 
that they be in there watering the muck, I think that's true, but that's 
not the test. As Mr. Ramsden points out, was there express direction 
to go in there which amounted to willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression? 
(Id., 11. 26:13-19.) What such evidence does demonstrate is precisely the scenario 
discussed in Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney, and later occurring in 
Dominguez. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 ("[T]here can be instances where an 
employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working environment 
would, in my judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression."). As such, 
the District Court's refusal to grant reconsideration on this point was in error. 
Further, the Court held that the MSHA Decision "did not get to a willful act, 
did not get to any physical aggression." (Id., 11. 25:14-15.) Again, while incorrectly 
applying a narrow reading of Kearney, this holding also erroneously fails to 
recognize that the MSHA Decision - imposing, after a fully litigated contested 
proceeding significant penalties on Hecla and noting "Heda's reckless disregard and 
unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard" (R. Adden. 19) - outlines 
the kind of conduct warned of by Justice Huntley and otherwise punished in 
Dominguez. The District Court thereby erred in failing to consider this information 
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and its support for Plaintiffs' allegations, and this Court should reverse. Fragnella, 
153 Idaho at 276 ("[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for 
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must 
determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat 
summary judgment."). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court's denial of the 
Mareks' Motion for Reconsideration, and remand the matter. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the April 21, 2015 decision of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to Hecla, and, in turn, denying the Mareks' motion for 
summary judgment, as well as the District Court's September 3, 2015, denial of the 
Mareks' motion for reconsideration, should be reversed and remanded to the 
District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?JJVJ day of December, 2015. 
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